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ATTENTION SHOPPERS: THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT'S FAILURE TO PREEMPT
CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS PROHIBITING
REVERSE ENGINEERING MAY CREATE
A BLUE LIGHT SPECIAL ON
JURISDICTIONAL FORUMS
Christopher T. Blackford*
Using preemption doctrine against contracts is something like swing-
ing a sledgehammer at a gnat: you are likely to hit the target, but you
may do some serious damage to the things around it. More likely
though.., you might decide not to swing the hammer at all, for fear
of hitting the wrong thing.1
I. INTRODUCTION
SIDE from the open source movement, which has struck fear in
corporations such as Microsoft, 2 the communitarian view of
software development largely became extinct as software be-
came profitable. Entrepreneurs eventually realized that by circulating
code without any proprietary protection, potential profits were being lost.
While the primary scope of legal protection afforded to computer pro-
grams was initially limited to trade secret rights, the legal community
eventually widened that scope to protect software under both copyright
and patent law.3 As the software development industry continued to
grow and evolve, businesses became more creative and sought protection
from trademark rights as well.
* B.S.E.E., 1999, M.S.E.E., 2001, University of Texas at Dallas; J.D. candidate 2004,
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law. The author would like to thank
Kyle Denbow and Candice Shindala for their helpful suggestions.
1. Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999).
2. The open source movement is a collaborative effort that encourages the free distri-
bution of software to enhance and improve software development. A discussion of the
open source movement and its impact on the mechanisms for protecting software is be-
yond the scope of this paper.
3. The software community initially relied on state trade secret law because doubts
existed as to whether object code was copyrightable. These doubts began to disappear
when the Copyright Act was amended in 1982. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (adding the
definition of computer program).
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Although it may be argued that only a few of these proprietary restric-
tions have been consistently utilized by attorneys to protect their client's
interests, the unique characteristics of software 4 and the competitive na-
ture of the industry compel inventors and attorneys to seek out all possi-
ble forms of protection both inside and outside the realm of intellectual
property. In particular, the features of a successful, large-scale software
business model, which primarily point to a wide distribution and public
network of software products, have forced attorneys and inventors to add
contractual arrangements to their arsenal of weapons. Contract law be-
came a viable and valuable intellectual property protection strategy be-
cause it addressed the short comings of a mass distribution business
model.
The problem with mass distribution of software is that it promotes ex-
actly what intellectual property owners want to prevent-loss of control.
Contracts cure this unwanted side effect of the business model, allowing
software developers to maintain a higher degree of control over their
commercially valuable knowledge than most traditional methods allow.
For example, software companies often write contractual provisions into
their software purchasing agreements that forbid the purchasing party or
others from reverse engineering 5 the product. Whether a contractual
provision is enforceable, and thus successful in prohibiting a competitor
from reverse engineering a program, depends on whether the private con-
tract triggers the express preemption provision under the Federal Copy-
right Act ("Copyright Act"), 6 the doctrine of field preemption,7 or the
doctrine of implied conflict preemption.8
The use of either private contracts or state statutes to prohibit a
software purchaser from reverse engineering a product has drawn com-
plaints of preemption because it (1) eliminates a course of action that has
been judicially recognized as a fair use defense to copyright infringement 9
and (2) removes the Copyright Act from its role as the primary vehicle
4. In the context of intellectual property protection, software has been described as
unique because it does not tailor itself in an ideal manner to any one of the available forms
of protection. See Bart W. Showalter, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law Lectures on Software Protection & Licensing (Spring 2003). For example, protecting
software under the statutory umbrella of the Federal Copyright Act has been described as
trying to fit a square peg into a circular hole. Id.
5. The United States Supreme Court has described reverse engineering as a "fair and
honest means... [of] starting with the known product and working backward to divine the
process which aided in its development of manufacture." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). When tailored to software development, reverse engineer-
ing is the process of deriving a program's human readable source code from its machine
readable object code. See Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Re-
verse Engineering of Computer Programs in the United States and the European Commu-
nity, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 25, 28-29 (1993). Programs are generally only distributed in
machine readable object code form because it is virtually impossible for a user to read. See
id.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1996); see infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
9. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992).
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through which copyright infringement is policed.10 Although current ju-
dicial trends suggest that courts are accepting these negative effects as a
corollary to upholding a sacred belief in freedom of contract, it is not
apparent whether the courts understand the implications of utilizing con-
tract law rather than copyright law to police copyright infringement.
This paper argues that judicial enforcement of contractual provisions
prohibiting reverse engineering will allow plaintiffs seeking copyright in-
fringement damages to contract around the Copyright Act as if it were a
default rule. Rather than seeking protection under the Copyright Act,
parties will instead attempt to enforce their rights through contract law.
Parties who rely on breach of contract to pursue copyright infringement
damages will do so without meeting any of the substantive requirements
of intellectual property law.1 Furthermore, courts will likely encounter
cases in which plaintiffs cast their federal copyright claims entirely as
state claims. An issue will then arise as to whether the courts should
allow plaintiffs to plead their federal copyright claims entirely as state
claims in order to avoid federal jurisdiction and seek the state forum of
contract law most favorable to their case. 12 Focusing on this issue, this
paper proposes that if courts continue to distinguish state contract claims
as qualitatively different from federal copyright claims in order to evade
the boundaries of copyright preemption, plaintiffs will not only be able to
escape federal jurisdiction by pleading purely state claims, but will also
likely become engaged in forum shopping among the states for the con-
tract law most favorable to their case.
This paper is divided into six parts. Following the introduction, Part II
provides a brief background on federal preemption. Part III of the paper
narrows the scope of the discussion by viewing preemption through the
lens of copyright law. Part IV of the paper presents a case study on a
recently released opinion that discusses the issue of whether preemption
strikes down contractual restraints against reverse engineering. After dis-
cussing the body of jurisprudence surrounding copyright preemption,
Part V discusses the jurisdictional implications of enforcing contractual
provisions prohibiting reverse engineering. Part VI concludes that in
light of promoting jurisdictional forum shopping for a federal cause of
action in which national uniformity is a primary legislative concern,
courts should not be afraid to swing the "preemptive hammer" to strike
down contractual provisions prohibiting reverse engineering.
10. See Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming the
trial court's decision to set aside copyright damages as duplicative of the contract dam-
ages); see also David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal
Preemption of Softvare Licensing Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PIrr. L.
Rnv. 543, 600-01 (1992).
11. Rice, supra note 10, at 600-01.
12. Id. at 610-11.
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II. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Preemption doctrine can be described as a judicial tool by which courts
control conflict between federal and state law. It begins with the
Supremacy Clause, which defines federal law as the "supreme law of the
land." 13
The Supremacy Clause states, in relevant part, that "[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. ' 14 Because the Supremacy
Clause defines federal law as supreme, state laws and regulations are pre-
empted when they conflict with the objectives of federal law. Under the
Supremacy Clause, courts have recognized three scenarios in which state
laws and regulations may be preempted by federal law: (1) "when Con-
gress, in enacting a federal statute, has expressed a clear intent to pre-
empt state law"; (2) "when it is clear, despite the absence of explicit
preemptive language, that Congress has intended ... to occupy an entire
field of regulation and has thereby 'left no room for States to supplement'
federal law"; and (3) "when compliance with both state and federal law is
impossible or ... state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 15
A. EXPRESS PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
When Congress passes a statute containing a set of preemptive parame-
ters, courts determine the preemptive scope of the provision.16 While it is
well settled that courts have the judicial authority to interpret the scope
of preemptive provisions, courts often struggle to find clear congressional
intent in the express language of these provisions. Courts face a difficult
task when trying to read congressional intent from a preemptive clause
because the language is often found to be ambiguous and devoid of any
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. Id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28 (3d ed.
2000), cited in Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C.
L. REV. 967, 1030 n.1 (2002).
15. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984).
This exclusive delegation or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty would
only exist in three cases: [(1)] where the Constitution in express terms
granted an exclusive authority to the Union; [(2)] where it granted in one
instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States from
exercising the like authority; and [(3)] where it granted an authority to the
Union to which a similar authority in the State would be absolutely and to-
tally contradictory and repugnant.
THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 166 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999), quoted
in Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 199, 236 n.163 (2002).
16. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000) (interpreting the
language of a preemptive provision); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (same);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (same).
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"clear congressional command.' 1 7
Until recently, the uncertainty emanating from the judicial construction
of an ambiguous preemptive provision was troubling. Not knowing how
a court would construe a statute's preemptive clause was an issue of con-
cern because the mere existence of the preemption clause in the statute
was thought to foreclose other avenues of preemption. 18 In Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., the Supreme Court recently settled the mat-
ter by holding that an explicit preemption clause does not preclude the
application of other avenues of preemption. 19 Therefore, if a court holds
that a statute's preemption provision does not preempt a state action, the
court may then proceed to ask whether other preemption principles
apply.
B. IMPLIED PREEMPTION DOCTRINES
While express preemption depends in part upon judicial interpretations
of legislative language, implied preemption doctrines are based on either
Congress's intent to preempt all state law in a particular area or an actual
conflict between state and federal law.20 Although the United States Su-
preme Court has historically utilized implied preemption doctrines as a
last resort,21 some legal commentators have suggested that the Court has
now shifted its preemption analysis away from express preemptive provi-
sions to implied doctrines.22
1. Implied Field Preemption
Implied field preemption exists when the "scheme of federal regulation
is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress 'left no room' for supplementary state regulation. ' 23 Thus, courts
will infer congressional intent to preempt all state law in a particular area
17. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding that the Medical De-
vice Amendment's preemption provision is highly ambiguous).
18. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 ("Congress's enactment of a provision defining the
pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-
empted.").
19. Geier, 529 U.S. at 872.
20. The scope of federal law capable of preempting state law has been repeatedly held
to encompass both federal statutes and regulations. Hillsborough County v. Automated
Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (citing Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 699;
Fidelity Federal Say. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982); United
States v. Shimmer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-83 (1961)).
21. See Davis, supra note 14, at 1014 (stating that implied conflict preemption histori-
cally "served as a catch-all to preserve federal law's supremacy").
22. Id. at 1012-13. However, recent preemption cases arising under copyright and con-
tract controversies suggest that the judicial application of express preemptive provisions is
alive and well. See Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Wrench
LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001); ProCD, Inc. v. Ziedenberg, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d
426 (8th Cir. 1993).
23. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (cit-
ing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also Capital Cities Cable,
467 U.S. at 698-99.
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and will likely preempt the state law at issue if congressional action has
been so complete that there is no room for state regulation. 24 Congres-
sional intent to preempt all state law in a particular area will also be in-
ferred if the "field [of law] is one in which 'the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforce-
ment of state laws on the same subject." 25 Consequently, the primary
focus of the courts is to ascertain the intent underlying the federal
scheme.26 When construing intent, the question of implicit intent to pre-
empt extends beyond congressional action, and includes bureaucratic
statements emanating from federal agencies. 27
2. Implied Conflict Preemption
Implied conflict preemption exists when courts recognize an actual
conflict between state and federal law. Conflicts that may nullify a state
law arise when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility," 28 or "when state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. '29 Therefore, the primary question for courts is whether a
state and federal regulation can be enforced without marring the "federal
superintendence" of the field.30 The issue is not whether both regulations
are aimed at similar or different objectives. 31
Il1. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF CONTRACTS IN THE
CONTEXT OF COPYRIGHT LAW
When determining whether a contract is preempted by the Copyright
Act, courts primarily look to the narrow statutory grounds of express pre-
emption provided for under § 301 of the Copyright Act.32 Although it is
not clear why a number of courts fail to consider preemption apart from
§ 301, the focus is on express preemption because the Copyright Act has
an explicit preemption clause.
24. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713.
25. Id. (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941).
26. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714.
27. See id. at 714-15 (stating that the FDA's statement was dispositive on the question
of implicit preemption when analyzing the field of plasmapheresis).
28. Id. at 713 (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-
43 (1963)).
29. Id. (quoting Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67).
30. Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 142.
31. Id.
32. See Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Wrench LLC v.
Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001); ProCD Inc. v. Ziedenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455
(7th Cir. 1996); Nat'l Car Rental Sys. Inc., v. Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 432
(8th Cir. 1993). But see Vault v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (adopt-
ing the Sears, Roebuck implied conflict preemption test, which states that federal policy
may not be set at naught when state law touches upon the area of patent or copyright
statutes).
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A. APPLYING EXPRESS PREEMPTION: 17 U.S.C. § 301
Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides, in relevant part, that:
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106... and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified
by sections 102 and 103 ... are governed exclusively by this title....
[N]o person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the 'common law or statutes' of any State.33
Under § 301, the Copyright Act preempts a state's statute or common law
when two requirements are met: (1) the work under dispute falls within
the scope of copyright protection under § 102 and § 103 of the Copyright
Act;34 and (2) the state law or common law affords rights that are
equivalent to rights provided in § 106 of the Copyright Act.3 5
1. Subject Matter Requirement
The first question under § 301(a) is whether the state law or common
law protects material within the scope of copyright law. This issue is criti-
cal because § 301 does not preempt state law protecting only non-statu-
tory subject matter. Courts look to § 102 and § 103 to determine whether
a work is within the subject matter of copyright. Sections 102 and 103
delineate what is and what is not within the scope of the Copyright Act.36
Section 102 provides that "[c]opyright protection subsists in ... original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. '37 In
addition, § 102 restricts the scope of copyrightable material by expressly
excluding ideas. 38 Section 103 extends protection to compilations and de-
rivative works, but not to the preexisting and underlying materials con-
tained within.39
Judicial precedent provides that computer programs are within the sub-
ject matter of copyright. 40 Software, which is usually an original work of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium, will likely contain forms of both
expression and ideas. Consequently, a contract prohibiting reverse engi-
neering of software inevitably bars access to both expression and ideas.4 1
While a § 301 analysis is unconcerned with the contractual protection af-
33. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2002) (emphasis added).
34. Id. This is commonly referred to as the subject matter requirement.
35. Id. This is commonly referred to as the equivalency requirement.
36. Whether a work is actually copyrightable is no indication of whether the work is
within the subject matter of copyright. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453; H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1476, at 131-32 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664. A work may fall within
the subject matter of copyright but not be copyrightable because it does not meet the
threshold standard of originality. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453-55; Bait. Orioles, Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
38. Id. § 102(b). Although § 102 does not expressly exclude facts from the scope of
protectable material, it is well settled that facts are not copyrightable. Feist Publ'ns v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 103.
40. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453; Nat'l Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 431-32.
41. See Rice, supra note 10, at 606.
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forded to the ideas in the program, the protection afforded to the pro-
gram's expression is critical because it is shielding statutory subject
matter. Therefore, a contract that shields statutory subject matter, such
as expression, satisfies the subject matter requirement under § 301(a) be-
cause the contract grants protection to material within the scope of copy-
right law.
2. Equivalency Requirement
Under the equivalency requirement, the primary issue is whether a
state enforced contract creates protection equivalent to any right defined
under § 106. Subject to certain limitations, 42 § 106 gives copyright own-
ers the exclusive rights to reproduce their work.4 3 It does not, however,
delineate when a state action is equivalent to a § 106 exclusive right.44 To
determine whether a state action is equivalent to a § 106 exclusive right,
most courts apply the "extra element" test.45
The extra element test provides that a state cause of action is not
equivalent to a § 106 exclusive right and is not preempted if an additional
element is found in the state cause of action that is not present in the
federal copyright infringement claim.46 Thus, the existence of an extra
element indicates that the equivalency requirement is not satisfied, and
that the state cause of action at issue is not preempted by the Copyright
Act. However, appellate courts have recognized that not every extra ele-
ment of a state law claim will sufficiently distinguish the state law claim to
render it dissimilar from the exclusive rights protected under the Copy-
right Act.4 7 Where the additional element "merely concerns the extent to
which authors and their licensee can prohibit unauthorized copying by
third parties," the state cause of action is equivalent to a copyright in-
fringement claim and is thus preempted by the Copyright Act.48
Courts applying the "extra element" test in the context of a copyright-
contract dispute frequently argue that an extra element is present in the
state contract claim that does not "merely concern the extent to which
authors and their licensee can prohibit unauthorized copying by third
parties. '49 Some courts propose that the extra element distinguishing the
42. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122.
43. Id. § 106.
44. See id.
45. See generally Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324; Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 458; ProCD, Inc.,
86 F.3d at 1455; Nat'l Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 431-32. The extra element test may also be
referred to as the "equivalent in substance" test.
46. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164-65 (1st Cir.
1994); see also Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992)
("But if an 'extra element' is 'required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction,
performance, distribution or display, in order to constitute a state-created cause of action,
then the right does not lie 'within the general scope of copyright,' and there is no preemp-
tion."' (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B], at 1-15)), quoted in Bowers, 320 F.3d
at 1324.
47. Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1164-65.
48. Id. at 1165.
49. Id.; see also Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324.
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state contract claim from any § 106 right is the mutual assent and consid-
eration inherent in a private contractual agreement.50 Other courts pro-
pose that a contractual restriction on the use of the software program is
an additional element distinguishing the state claim from § 106,51 and yet
others propose that "expectation of compensation" from an implied-in-
fact contract is an element not envisioned by § 106.52 Whether courts are
correct in holding that mutual consent and consideration is an additional
element sufficient to distinguish a state claim from a federal copyright
infringement claim, particularly when the contractual agreement is not
freely negotiated and is void of any arms length dealing, is addressed in
Part IV of this paper.
B. APPLYING IMPLIED FIELD PREEMPTION
It is unlikely that a court will ever use implied field preemption to hold
that contracts relating to copyrightable software goods are preempted by
the Copyright Act. The weights are stacked against implied field preemp-
tion because the judicial utilization of the doctrine would imply that con-
gressional action has been so complete in the field of intellectual property
law that there is no room for state regulation. Such a holding would be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's seminal decisions in Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp.53 and Goldstein v. California.54
1. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution does not Foreclose
State Protection of Intellectual Property
Kewanee and Goldstein, which both concluded that there was no pre-
emption of the state law at issue, do not stand for the argument that Arti-
cle I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution granted Congress exclusive
power to make and enforce laws protecting intellectual property. 55 In-
stead, these cases recognize that Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Con-
stitution does not foreclose state protection of intellectual property.56
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., when it stated that "[s]tate law is not displaced merely because
the contract relates to intellectual property which may or may not be pat-
entable; the states are free to regulate the use of such intellectual prop-
50. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1326.
51. Nat'l Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 432 (construing a contract prohibiting a party from
using a program to process data for third parties as insufficient to create a right existing
under copyright law).
52. Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 459 (distinguishing implied in law contracts from implied
in fact contracts by recognizing that an implied in law contract is only based upon unautho-
rized use of the work - not an expectation of compensation) (citing Del Madera Props. v.
Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987)).
53. 416 U.S. 470 (1973).
54. 412 U.S. 546 (1974).
55. Id. at 553; Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479.
56. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 553; Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479; see also Rice, supra note 10,
at 582.
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erty in any manner not inconsistent with federal law."'57 While the
Court's language in Aronson recognizes that state regulation in the area
of intellectual property is permissible, such regulation is allowed only to
the extent that it remains consistent with federal law.58 Therefore, Aron-
son suggests that implied field preemption is a dead body of law in the
context of copyright and patent law. Aronson, however, does not pre-
clude other forms of implied preemption such as conflict preemption.
C. APPLYING IMPLIED CONFLICT PREEMPTION
The majority of courts adjudicating copyright-contract disputes fail to
analyze the state cause of action under implied conflict preemption.5 9 In-
stead of expanding the judicial scrutiny of preemption to include implied
conflict preemption, courts addressing the issue begin and end their anal-
ysis by reviewing express preemption under § 301.60 Despite the courts'
unexplained failure to utilize implied conflict preemption in cases presid-
ing over copyright-contract disputes, legal precedent supports the princi-
ple that a state cause of action is preempted if it conflicts with federal law.
More specifically, a state cause of action is preempted if it "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. ' 61 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stands as
the lone jurisdiction utilizing implied conflict preemption to resolve copy-
right-contract disputes.
1. Vault Corp. v. Quaid
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., the Fifth Circuit preempted a
provision of the Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act that al-
lowed software producers to impose contractual restraints against the re-
verse engineering of software.62 Pursuant to the preemptive strike
against the statute, the court held that the contractual restriction in the
license agreement prohibiting reverse engineering was unenforceable. 63
This holding was premised upon the district court's classification of the
license agreement as a contract of adhesion.64 The district court held that
as a contract of adhesion, the license agreement was only enforceable if
57. 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979), quoted in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
58. Id.
59. See cases cited supra, note 32.
60. Id.
61. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
62. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 269. The district court defined a contract of adhesion as one that "is drafted
unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a 'take-it-or-leave-it basis' to the
weaker party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms." Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 760 (E.D. La. 1987) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLic-r OF LAws § 187 cmt. b (1971), and citing Burbank v. Ford Motor Co.,
703 F.2d 865, 866-67 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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the Louisiana statute was valid and enforceable. 65 Thus, the critical pre-
emptive issue was not whether the license agreement "touched upon an
area" of federal copyright law. The issue was whether the Louisiana stat-
ute "touched upon an area" of federal copyright law.
a. A State Law that Touches upon an Area of Federal Copyright
Law and Conflicts with Rights of Software Owners
Under § 117 is Preempted
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals based its preemption ruling in Vault
on the implied preemption test articulated in Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co.66 In Sears, the Supreme Court held that "[w]hen state law
touches upon the area of [patent or copyright law], it is 'familiar doctrine'
that the federal policy 'may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied' by
state law."' 67  The Fifth Circuit applied the Sears implied preemption
test, holding that the restrictive provision of the statute was preempted
because restraints against copying and reverse engineering "conflict with
the rights of the computer program owners under § 117 and clearly 'touch
upon an area' of federal copyright law."'68 Although Vault is criticized for
ignoring the express statutory preemption provision contained in § 301 of
the Copyright Act,69 the case establishes that preemption is proper when
a state law touches upon an area of federal copyright law and conflicts
with rights of software owners under § 117. Thus, the case is significant
because it demonstrates that implied conflict preemption can and should
be used to strike down state action that clashes with the objectives of
federal copyright law.
IV. A CASE STUDY OF A SOFTWARE CONTRACT/
COPYRIGHT DISPUTE: BOWERS v. BAYSTATE
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
In Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc, the defendant, Mr. Bowers,
sold a computer aided design ("CAD") software package implementing a
65. Vault Corp., 655 F. Supp. at 761. The Fifth Circuit's adoption of the district court's
holding raises concern as to whether standard form agreements such as shrink-wrap li-
censes are valid and enforceable software contracts. Although it appears the Fifth Circuit
does not treat such instruments favorably, some legal commentators look to Judge Easter-
brook's opinion in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeiedenberg as a ringing endorsement for the validity of
shrink-wrap agreements. See 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). Other legal scholars cite
the recently proposed revisions under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code as fur-
ther proof that standard form agreements and shrink-wrap licenses should be enforced.
However, the Article 2 revisions incorporating pro-shrink-wrap language appear to be
dead in the water.
66. 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
67. Id. (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)).
68. Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 270. Section 117 of the Copyright Act permits copies of
computer software provided that the new copy is "an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program." 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).
69. McManis, supra note 5, at 88 (criticizing Vault).
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template he had patented.70 In an attempt to improve his template and
CAD software, Bowers bundled his software package with an add-on
program. 71 Labeled as Designer's Toolkit, the bundled software package
was sold with a shrink-wrap license that prohibited reverse engineering.72
Shortly after Bowers released Designer's Toolkit, Baystate, Bowers' com-
petitor, offered a similar software package incorporating many features
of Designer's Toolkit.73 The development of Draft-Pak, Baystate's
software, surprised Bowers. One year before Bowers' software release,
Baystate had rejected an offer from Bowers to have the Designer's Tool-
kit software package bundled with Draft-Pak. 74 Furthermore, Baystate
had introduced its software package three months after it obtained three
copies of Bowers' Designer's Toolkit.75
When Baystate sued Bowers for declaratory judgment,76 Bowers filed
counterclaims for copyright infringement, patent infringement, and
breach of contract. 77 The jury found Baystate liable on all three counter-
claims, but the district court set aside the copyright damages as duplica-
tive of the contract damages. 78 Both parties appealed the district court's
judgment. Baystate appealed the denial of its motion for judgment as a
matter of law, and Bowers appealed it denial of copyright damages. 79
On appeal, Baystate claimed it was not liable for breach of contract
because the Copyright Act preempts the provision of the license agree-
ment prohibiting reverse engineering. 80 The Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, applying the law of the First Circuit Court of Appeals,81 held that
the Copyright Act does not preempt Bowers' breach of contract claim.82
Therefore, the court declined to extend the preemptive holding of Vault
to include "private contractual agreements supported by mutual consent
and consideration.'" 83
70. 320 F.3d 1317, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The patented template improves the CAD
program by placing commands in a visual and logical order. Id. at 1321. Without the tem-
plate, commands in a CAD program are often presented to users in nested menus that are
many layers deep. Id. Such layering can make it difficult for a user to find a desired
command in a short period of time. Id.
71. Id. at 1321-22.




76. Baystate sued Bowers for declaratory judgment, asserting that (1) its products did





80. Id. at 1323. Baystate also successfully appealed the verdict of patent infringement.
However, the scope of this case study is limited to Baystate's preemption claims on appeal.
81. While patent issues are unique to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, preemp-
tion issues are not. Id. at 1322. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the law of the circuit from which the appeal was taken to adjudicate the issue of preemp-
tion. Id. at 1322-23. The appeal was from the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 1322.
82. Id. at 1323.
83. Id. at 1325 (emphasis added).
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A. EXPRESS PREEMPTION ANALYSIS UNDER 17 U.S.C. § 301
The Federal Circuit's preemption analysis started and ended under
§ 301(a) of the Copyright Act. Skipping the subject matter requirement
under § 301, the court began its inquiry with the equivalency requirement
by applying the "extra element" test. To apply this test, the court in-
quired as to whether the breach of contract claim contained an "extra
element" sufficient to make it qualitatively different from the copyright
claim.8 4 If an extra element existed, the state cause of action would not
be "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright, '8 5 and federal copyright law would not preempt the breach of
contract claim.
1. The Mutual Assent and Consideration Required by a Contract Claim
Render that Claim Qualitatively Different from a Copyright
Infringement Claim
Following the rationale of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg86 and Data Gen-
eral Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.,87 the Federal Circuit
found an additional element in the breach of contract claim sufficient to
render the claim qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim.88 The court determined that the additional element distinguishing
the state contract claim from a federal copyright claim was the mutual
assent and consideration required by the contract claim.8 9 This conclu-
sion implies that a shrink-wrap license, an agreement "drafted unilater-
ally by the dominant party and then presented on a 'take-it-or-leave-it
basis' to the weaker party," 90 contains elements of both mutual assent
and consideration. It also implies that states can permit parties to use
shrink-wrap license agreements to contract away fair use defenses and
other statutory rights.
B. A CRITIQUE OF EXPRESS PREEMPTION IN BOWERS
1. Is a "Shrink-Wrap" License Agreement a Freely Negotiated
Agreement?
The holding in Bowers is hard to swallow because the court labeled the
disputed license agreement as a "shrink-wrap" license agreement. Re-
gardless of whether the court is correct in stating that the mutual assent
and consideration found in a freely negotiated contract is sufficient for
Bowers to avoid preemption under § 301, the application of this legal
principle requires parties to have actually entered into a freely negotiated
84. See id.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
86. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
87. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
88. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325 (citing ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1454).
89. Id.
90. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 760 (E.D. La. 1987) (quot-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. 6 (1971)).
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agreement. In the present case, the license agreement in dispute is not a
freely negotiated agreement. 91 The license agreement is a shrink-wrap
agreement, which, as Vault recognized, is generally "drafted unilaterally
by the dominant party and then presented on a 'take-it-or-leave-it basis'
to the weaker party."' 92 Where a party to a contract has no real opportu-
nity to bargain about its terms, one cannot argue that mutual assent and
consideration preclude preemption of the state law claim. As indicated in
the Bowers dissent, only a freely negotiated agreement embodies the "ex-
tra element" that allows Bowers to avoid express statutory preemption
under § 301.93
2. Should Courts Enforce the Contractual Waiver of Affirmative
Defenses when the Contract is a "Shrink-Wrap" License
Agreement?
If courts conclude that mutual assent and consideration constitute an
additional element precluding preemption, the implication is that a state
can permit parties to contract away fair use defenses such as reverse engi-
neering. Although the majority opinion in Bowers cites a First Circuit
case supporting the contractual waiver of affirmative defenses and statu-
tory rights, the authority cited is not factually similar to the present
case. 94 In United States v. Spector, the First Circuit held that "a contrac-
tual waiver of the statute of limitations defense constitutes an 'effective
waiver of defendant's rights under the statute of limitations' if the agree-
ment were properly executed, and the 'waiver is made knowingly and
voluntarily.'95 The precedential value of this case is questionable for
two reasons. First, it is unclear whether a waiver of a statute of limita-
tions defense is equivalent to a waiver of a fair use defense. Second, it is
questionable whether waiver of a right to reverse engineer occurs know-
ingly and voluntarily when made through a shrink-wrap license agree-
ment. A licensee is often unaware of the terms in the shrink-wrap license
agreement when purchasing a product.
C. A CRITIQUE OF IMPLIED PREEMPTION IN BOWERS
Like the majority of cases addressing contract preemption in the con-
text of copyright law, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals failed to con-
sider implied conflict preemption. Under implied conflict preemption,
the contract would likely be preempted because it "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress."'96
91. Circuit Judge Dyk's dissent outlines a similar argument. See Bowers, 320 F.3d at
1336-37 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
92. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 760 (E.D. La. 1987).
93. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336-37 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (citing United States v. Spector, 55 F.3d 22, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1995)).
95. Id. (quoting Spector, 55 F.3d at 24-25).
96. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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1. Allowing a State to Eliminate Reverse Engineering as a Fair use
Defense Precludes the Accomplishment and Execution of the
Full Purposes and Objectives of Congress
a. Reverse Engineering Constitutes a Fair Use Under the Copyright
Act
In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., the Federal Circuit
held that reverse engineering constitutes a fair use under the Copyright
Act. 97 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits also hold that reverse engineer-
ing constitutes fair use,9 8 and no other federal court of appeals has dis-
agreed. 99 Courts have consistently recognized reverse engineering as a
fair use defense because "a prohibition on all copying whatsoever would
stifle the free flow of ideas without serving any legitimate interest of the
copyright holder."10 0 Thus, a complete prohibition on copying is undesir-
able because instead of promoting the progress of science, it would only
serve as an obstacle to the progress of science.
b. A Reverse Engineering Fair Use Defense Meets the Objectives
of Congress by Promoting the Progress of Science and
the Useful Arts
Congress is constitutionally committed "[tlo promot[ing] the [p]rogress
of [s]cience and useful [a]rts." 10 1 Reverse engineering as a fair use de-
fense advances this congressional objective by allowing public access to
what is otherwise unprotectable material. More specifically, reverse engi-
neering allows the public to access the ideas and facts in a copyrightable
work that Congress has declared to be free to all under the Copyright
Act.
c. Elimination of a Reverse Engineering Fair Use Defense
Obstructs the Promotion of Science and the Useful Arts
If a state is allowed to enforce contractual agreements eliminating the
fair use defense of reverse engineering, a copyright holder, through state
law, will be able to protect material that Congress intended to hold un-
protectable.1 02 Extending a copyright holder the ability to protect facts
and ideas precludes the flow of such information, impeding rather than
promoting science and the useful arts. Therefore, any contract imple-
menting a provision prohibiting reverse engineering should be pre-
97. 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
98. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citing Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc.,
79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996), and Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992)).
99. Id. (Dyk, J., dissenting).
100. Atari, 975 F.2d at 843.
101. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
102. See Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989)).
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empted, because it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
D. ANOTHER CRITIQUE: BOWERS MISINTERPRETS VAULT CORP. V.
QUAID SOFTWARD LTD.
In Bowers, the Federal Circuit declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's ra-
tionale in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd. 0 3 The majority narrowly
construes Vault, reading it to stand for the proposition that "a state law
prohibiting all copying of a computer program is preempted by the Fed-
eral Copyright Act. 104 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit quickly dis-
misses Vault, stating that "no evidence suggests the First Circuit would
extend this concept to include private contractual agreements supported
by mutual assent and consideration."'' 0 5
The court's dismissal of Vault is troubling for two reasons. First and
foremost, the majority misunderstood the holding in Vault when it limited
the preemptive strike to state laws prohibiting all copying.10 6 While Vault
does indeed propose preemption of state laws prohibiting all computer
program copying, it further proposes preemption of state laws enforcing
or authorizing contractual restraints against reverse engineering.10 7 Be-
cause Vault treats both prohibitions against copying and constraints on
reverse engineering equally, the court further erred when it used the dif-
ference between a state law and a private contract to distinguish Vault.
Regardless of whether such a distinction is sufficient for other areas of
law, the express preemption clause of the Copyright Act states that it
preempts "any such right or equivalent right ... under the common law
or statutes of any State.1108 Therefore, the proper conclusion, as indi-
cated by Judge Dyk in dissent, is that in the context of copyright preemp-
tion, there is no distinction between a state law validating a contract that
prohibits reverse engineering and general common law that permits such
a restriction. 10 9
V. THE JURISDICTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF ENFORCING
CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS PROHIBITING
REVERSE ENGINEERING
If courts continue to distinguish state contract claims as qualitatively
different from federal copyright claims, the judicial system will encourage
plaintiffs to cast their federal copyright claims entirely as state contract
claims so as to avoid the federal jurisdiction tied to claims arising under
the Copyright Act. Encouraging such behavior is ill advised. Courts that
103. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1337 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
107. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1988).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
109. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1337 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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distinguish state contract claims not only suggest that both states and
plaintiffs are free to set the substantive requirements of copyright law at
naught, but also promote forum shopping among states for the contract
law most favorable to a plaintiff's case. Whether courts will allow plain-
tiffs to cast their federal copyright claims solely as state contract claims
depends on how the courts will interpret various doctrines of pleading.
This paper proposes that plaintiffs, as the masters of their complaints, will
likely be allowed to plead their complaints exclusively under state law.
Furthermore, this paper proposes that defendants will likely be unable to
remove these cases to federal court.
A. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT
1. The "Well Pleaded Complaint Rule" Suggests Plaintiffs can Solely
Rely on State Claims
The "well pleaded complaint rule" governs the issue of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction.' 10 It provides that a cause of action exists under federal
law when a well pleaded complaint presents issues of federal law.111 Pur-
suant to § 1338(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code, an issue of fed-
eral law is present when a plaintiff pleads a cause of action arising under
the Copyright Act.112 Therefore, the well pleaded complaint doctrine
suggests that if plaintiff, as the master of his complaint, elects to exclu-
sively rely on state law rather than copyright claims, he or she will avoid
federal question jurisdiction.11 3
2. Absent Complete Preemption, a Case Cannot be Removed to
Federal Court on the Basis of a Federal Preemption Defense
Federal preemption is generally raised as a defense to a plaintiff's alle-
gations. In the context of a contract dispute relating to copyrightable
software, federal preemption is usually raised as a defense to a breach of
contract claim. Prior to 1887, this federal defense provided proper
grounds for removing a case from state to federal court. 114 In 1887, how-
ever, Congress amended the removal statute to authorize removal only
where the original cause of action could have been filed in federal
court.1 1 5 Pursuant to this congressional amendment, the Supreme Court
110. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
111. Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987); Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
112. Federal district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over "any civil ac-
tion arising under any Act of Congress relating to" copyrights. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
Although the language of § 1338(a) strongly suggests that the Federal Courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over copyright claims, cases have demonstrated that some copyright dis-
putes do not "arise" under the Copyright Act for jurisdictional purposes. See T.B. Harms
Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964) (providing a three part test for federal
jurisdictional analysis of copyright claims).
113. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392 n.7 (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478
U.S. 804, 809 n.6 (1986) ("Jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff
has not advanced.")).
114. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000); Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392-93.
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has held that a federal preemption defense is insufficient grounds for re-
moval to federal court.116 This rule of law holds true, the Supreme Court
stated, "even if the [preemption] defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's
complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal [preemption]
defense is the only question truly at issue."' 17 Thus, a defendant named
in a breach of contract suit in state court cannot solely rely on a claim of
federal copyright preemption to remove the case to federal court.
3. A Claim Purportedly Based on a Preempted State Law, However, is
Considered a Federal Claim Arising under Federal Law
As an "independent corollary" to the well pleaded complaint rule,
courts have recognized a doctrine of "complete preemption. '118 The doc-
trine of complete preemption provides that "[o]nce an area of state law
has been completely preempted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-
empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and
therefore arises under federal law."' 19 Thus, the proper inquiry in the
context of a contract-copyright dispute is whether the complete preemp-
tion doctrine would read a state claim for breach of contract as a federal
copyright claim for the purposes of the well pleaded complaint rule.
4. If a Defendant Relies on a Federal Preemption Defense under the
Copyright Act, it is Unlikely that the Complete Preemption
Doctrine will Allow the Defendant to Remove the
Case to Federal Court
A defendant bears the heavy burden of convincing a court to utilize the
complete preemption doctrine to convert an ordinary state claim for
breach of contract to a federal copyright claim for purposes of the well
pleaded complaint rule. To convince a court that complete preemption
applies, a defendant would likely have to prove that the preemptive force
of copyright law is "so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of
action for violation of contracts" between the copyright holder and
software purchaser. 120
116. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)).
117. Id. at 393 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12).
118. Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22).
119. Id. (emphasis added); see also Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24 ("[I]f a federal
cause of action completely preempts a state cause of action, any complaint that comes
within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law.");
Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987) (recognizing that if the "preemptive
force of a statute is so extraordinary," it "converts an ordinary state common law com-
plaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well pleaded complaint rule").
120. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23). Al-
though the Supreme Court speaks of an "artful pleading" doctrine, which provides that "a
plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a com-
plaint," the Court limits the practical application of such a doctrine by restricting its use to
decisions in which the preemptive force is extraordinarily powerful. See Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. at 22-24.
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In light of the current body of jurisprudence surrounding copyright-
contract disputes, no reasonable court would conclude that copyright law
is powerful enough to preempt any state cause of action for violation of a
contract. Not only do the majority of courts adjudicating software con-
tract disputes uniformly hold that the specific contract at issue is not pre-
empted by the Copyright Act, but the Supreme Court has stated that
"courts usually read preemption clauses to leave private contracts unaf-
fected. ' 12 1 Even if "complete preemption" were construed more nar-
rowly to confer removal to federal court when only the current state
cause of action is preempted, the doctrine still provides no jurisdictional
remedy for a defendant in almost all copyright-contract disputes. There-
fore, if a defendant relies on a claim of federal copyright preemption, it is
unlikely that the complete preemption doctrine will allow the defendant
to remove the case to federal court.
VI. CONCLUSION
While courts are correct to place some emphasis on a party's freedom
to contract, the majority of courts fail to recognize that a party's con-
tracting rights are far from invincible.1 22 Although most courts adjudicat-
ing software contract disputes uniformly hold that the specific contract at
issue is not preempted by the Copyright Act, no court has held that all
contracts relating to copyrightable goods are outside the preemption
clause.12 3 On the contrary, courts have recognized that the "law of con-
tract could interfere with the attainment of national objectives and there-
fore come within the domain of the [Copyright Act]."' 2 4
If courts continue to ignore implied preemption to enforce contractual
provisions that prohibit reverse engineering, the legal system will allow
plaintiffs seeking copyright infringement damages to contract around the
Copyright Act as if it were a default rule. Rather than seeking protection
under the Copyright Act, parties will instead attempt to enforce their
121. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Am. Airlines,
Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995)); see also Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320
F.3d 1317, 1323 ("Courts respect freedom of contract and do not lightly set aside freely
entered agreements.").
122. Brulotte v. Thys Co. is a Supreme Court case that demonstrates how vulnerable a
party's freedom to contract is. 379 U.S. 29 (1964). In that case, the Court held that a party
may not use contracts to extend the maximum federal term for a patent. Brulotte proves
first hand that freedom to contract in the intellectual property arena yields to federal law.
123. See generally Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1323-24 (stating that, at times, "federal regula-
tion may preempt private contract"); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th
Cir. 2001) (following ProCD, Inc., stating that "preemption should continue to strike down
claims that, though denominated 'contract,' nonetheless complain directly about the repro-
duction of expressive materials" (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIM-
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 101[B][1][a] (1999)); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1455 (7th Cir. 1996)
("[W]e think it prudent to refrain from adopting a rule that anything with the label con-
tract is necessarily outside the preemption clause.")); see also Nat'l Car Rental Sys. Inc., v.
Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 432 (8th Cir. 1993) (cautioning that a contractual
restriction could impermissibly "protect rights equivalent to the exclusive copyright
rights").
124. ProCD, Inc., 83 F.3d at 1455 (citing Nat'l Car Rental, 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993)).
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rights through contract law. Thus, courts will encounter cases in which
plaintiffs plead their federal copyright claims entirely as state claims in
order to avoid federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs will not only be able to es-
cape federal jurisdiction by pleading purely state claims, but will also
likely become engaged in state-wide forum shopping for the contract law
most favorable to their case. Courts should not promote state-wide juris-
dictional forum shopping for a federal cause of action in which national
uniformity is a primary legislative concern. If courts can learn to swing
the "preemptive hammer" correctly, courts will likely eliminate the juris-
dictional windfall to plaintiffs that current precedent enforces.
